discipline, sophrosyne implied, was "shame" or "fear of reproach." Thus, what made "good soldiers" was their mortal fear of public "shame" and the "reproach" of their commanders and the populations for whom they fought. Second, sophrosyne was not just a compound word; it was a particular kind of compound word, signaling the presence of two competing conceptions -both of them true at the same time. Moderation and shame sound different, one a confident stance and the other a distressing outcome. But in sophrosyne, the two meanings were forever locked in enforced partnership. Similarly, "discipline" rooted in "shame," and "valor" based on fear of "reproach," represented different kinds of motivation, 5 but, as integral features of sophrosyne, they constituted a creative, if also an excruciating, tension akin to the "warlike" and "wise" capabilities of a well-trained soldier. "If the more commercial Greek cities stood at one end of the ancient spectrum," classical historian Paul Rahe observes, "Sparta stood at the other. Of all the Hellenic communities, she came the closest to giving absolute primacy to the common good. She did this by turning the city into a camp, the pó lis into an army, and the citizen into a soldier." Finally, there is another path to the etymology of "moderation"; the antonym of sophrosyne is polypragmosyne (pronounced "poly-prag-mo-SEE-nay") or the manner of a "busybody."
7 In this sense, Greek moderation was the maturity and good sense to leave well enough alone. According to one modern editor, Thucydides distinguished between "real moderates," who kept the horrors of war firmly lodged in their civic consciousness, and "moderate partisans" during the horrible latter stages of the Peloponnesian War, who fought with one eye on their duty, the other on their survival.
8
Just as the United States and Britain in the 1940s and 1950s lived in the shadow of the Munich crisis and looked back on the appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s as a political and moral disaster, so in the early fourth century b.c., educated Athenians learned from Thucydides that the failure to practice moderation during the Peloponnesian War had been a defining tragic event in their own recent history.
9 Aristotle perpetuated the compound character of political moderation as a lesson of recent history and as timeless ethical consideration. As he explained in Book Two of his Nicomachean Ethics (dedicated to his son, Nicomachus), "moral virtue is a mean between two vices, one involving excess [ 
10
So difficult and important was this search that Aristotle translated the concept of middle ethical ground into a problem in mathematics and geometry -the classical disciplines most renowned for clarity and rigor. Viewed from that perspective, moderation defined the very nature of humanity itself as a striving to measure up to the highest potentiality in relation to variables of time and circumstance. Ethical political decisions were often a matter of timing, of measuring time in relation to appropriate actions and choices. The Greek rhetorician Protagoras called "man the measure" of all things, meaning that there are no moral standards external to humans being themselves. Drawing from Euclid, Aristotle posited that the best political choices lay among a range of possible options in an ethical triangulation from the point of view of the individual somewhere in the middle between extremes of barbarism (natural man) and moral zealotry (sophistication or expertise carried to a putrified extreme). The least of two evils, Aristotle concluded, lay somewhere in the middle of an ethical arc as viewed by man looking outward from the center of a knowable world; "hence . . . it is no easy task to find the middle."
11

Political Moderation
An Introduction
Who -moderating melody with different sounds and voices yet most satisfying to sensitive ears -heals sickness, has mingled cold with heat and moisture with dryness, the rough with the smooth, sweetness with pain, shadows with light, quiet with motion, tribulation with prosperity. This greatest harmony of the universe, though discordant, contains our safety.
Jean Bodin, 1576
Political moderation has been, and remains, misunderstood. "Moderation is not an halting betwixt two opinions, . . . nor is it lukewarmness," Thomas Fuller declared on the eve of the English Civil War. "But it is a mixture of charity and discretion in ones judgment." 1 Charity was a religious duty and principle, discretion a prudential option, and moderation allowed both to co-exist as an ethical insight. Those elements were the heart of the matter. Political moderation consisted of these ordinary materials -inherited beliefs or principles; natural caution, selfprotectiveness, or prudence; and an ethical compass in matters of governance and citizenship. In our own time, moderation rebukes corrosive partisanship from the right or the left, but because, as Fuller observed, "moderate men are commonly crushed betwixt the extreme parties on both sides," 2 moderation historically has been, and in some respects remains, a risky, hazardous commitment to mediation of intractable political disputes or to ongoing conciliation of persistent social conflicts. Because almost every sane person is in some respects a moderate (habitually preferring the company of a respectable constituency of allies to the solitary advocacy of bizarre opinions), political moderates will be defined in these pages as persons who intentionally undertake civic action, at significant risk or cost, to mediate conflicts, conciliate antagonisms, or find middle ground. Political moderation has been, moreover, a human phenomenon: the cleareyed recognition and willing acceptance of paradox in the discussion and exercise of power. Except for saints and zealots, no one mediated, conciliated, or reached across political divides all of the time. Those who did were radicals. Moderation has been, rather, a phenomenon of the moment, and moderates have spent time and effort considering and choosing -or allowing themselves to be caught up in -moments of political peacemaking.
3
From the early modern period until well into the twentieth century, political moderation has encouraged men and women in responsible positions of power to look to Renaissance statecraft for historic guidance. At the same time the history of political moderation has embraced more than government, law, and democratic institutions. Moderation has also curbed and channeled political discourse and consciousness throughout civil society. 4 The history of political moderation did not arise just from politics per se but also from political dimensions of family, community, and religious life.
The favored son of America's first great political family, John Quincy Adams, understood the cost of political moderation, and he grappled with the moderate paradox of being simultaneously principled and prudent as a holder of political trust. On January 27, 1804, President Thomas Jefferson, Vice President Aaron Burr, and Senator John Quincy Adams, a Federalist from Massachusetts, attended a party at Stelle's Hotel in Washington, D.C., to celebrate the ratification of the Louisiana Purchase. In this gathering of Republican Party notables, Adams felt distinctly out of place, and when someone toasted the proposition, "To the tempestuous Sea of Liberty, may it never be calm!" Adams declined to raise his glass. This book offers answers to those questions. Chapter 1 locates the beginnings of American political moderation in seventeenth-and eighteenthcentury trans-Atlantic dissemination of British and European moderation throughout the Atlantic world -an epoch during which British moderates apprehensively equated Augustan power and prosperity with the Roman transition from republican to imperial rule. Chapter 2 examines the role of political moderates during the era of the American Revolution and charts the ways in which successive stages of resistance, rebellion, warfare, and Christian republicanism moderated, while in the process of creating, a stable constitutional republic. Chapter 3 then chronicles the formation of politically moderate regions in the Southern backcountry and the Middle West. Finally, Chapter 4 demonstrates the ways in which denominational Christianity (institutional and efficient) and primitive Christianity (spontaneous and situational) moderated, of all things, moderation itself. Illustrating these processes are two detailed case studies of religiously grounded political moderation from the 1850s, one from Due West, South Carolina, and the other from the Vine Street neighborhood in Nashville, Tennessee. Those episodes are the climax not only of the chapter but the entire bookdocumenting conclusively the moderating effects of denominationalprimitive competition as agencies of order and civility in politics and society. Four Conclusions draw the elements of the book together and echo questions posed first in the Introduction. The Prologue on the birth of political moderation in ancient Sparta reveals the subtlety and complexity of the earliest language about moderation, and the Epilogue pinpoints the rise and influence of moderate liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century.
The historical record of political moderation underscores a major finding: while the substantial core of political moderation expressed itself as political philosophy at the core of civil society, at the outer edge of moderation, where it blended into political culture, moderation intermingled with religion.
6 Epigraphs by Harvey Mansfield, Jr., and Reinhold Niebuhr, at the opening of this book, plot its coordinates. Mansfield is a moderate conservative political philosopher, Niebuhr was a moderate liberal religious ethicist. Written and spoken as World War II erupted, Niebuhr's words about freedom, love, and the limitations of the "gregarious impulse" groped toward an understanding of religiously grounded moderation; as the Cold War ended, Mansfield spoke of moderates as "volunteers" in a society arbitrarily polarized between liberal choice and conservative duty. In war and peace, in political disagreement and consensus, the narrative of moderation history explores unfolding and reshaping human dilemmas.
The history of political thought indicates two contrasting and also complementary ways of approaching political moderation. Informed by political philosophy, the first approach goes to the central core of moderation as a tradition and deals with jurisprudence. This book takes a different tack by locating the peripheral outer edges of moderation, where it made contact with political culture and where religion and ethics disseminated moderation into the civil order. In 1989, as I sought to redirect my then still rudimentary investigation into early American religion and politics, legal historian Christian G. Fritz initiated a philosophical and jurisprudential study of the search for constitutional "middle ground" in the six decades following American independence.
7 Neither Fritz nor I ever became aware of each other's projects, yet it was no coincidence that, eighteen years later, both our book manuscripts found their way to Lewis Bateman's desk at Cambridge University Press in New York.
definitions
Political moderation invites appreciative description, and sometimes casual dismissal, but resists rigorous definition. Moderation may have been a moral and social virtue and a synonym for political reasonableness, but the concept of historic political moderation is not an ideal typology. Viewed in the context of the turbulent, complex political and intellectual history of the early modern Western world, political moderation can be defined, somewhat ambiguously, in five different ways:
1. Political moderation was an ideology in the making which failed to coalesce. After Thucydides discovered moderation and Aristotle enshrined it in his Ethics (see above), St. Augustine made moderation one of the marks of the beloved community. There it remained ensconced within the protective layering of Christian doctrine for more than a thousand years. Then in the two years following the 1572 St. Bartholomew Day massacre of Huguenot leaders in France, the Renaissance humanist Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and the Huguenot theorist François Hotman (1524-1590) resurrected political moderation as an autonomous concept.
8 During the turbulent century that followed, four successive generations of moderate political thinkers challenged threatening religious and political polarization by planting moderate remedies directly in between extreme immoderate poles: conciliation (during the 1570s and '80s); custom (1590s
